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The Economic Impact of Merger Control Legislation 
 
Abstract 
 
We construct a unique dataset of legislative reforms in merger control legislation that 
occurred in nineteen industrial countries in the period 1987-2004, and investigate the 
economic impact of these changes on stock prices. In line with the hypothesis that merger 
control should challenge anticompetitive mergers and thus limit future monopolistic profits, 
we find that the strengthening of merger control decreases the stock prices of non-financial 
firms. In contrast, we find that bank stock prices increase. Cross sectional regressions show 
that the discretion embedded in the supervisory control of bank mergers is a major 
determinant of the positive bank stock returns. This suggests that merger control is 
anticipated to create a “separation of powers” and “checks and balances” mechanism in the 
banking sector that mitigates the potential for abuse and wasteful enforcement of the 
supervisory control. We provide a case study further supporting this interpretation. 
 
Keywords: merger control, legal institutions, financial regulation. 
JEL codes: G21, G28, D4. 
 
1. Introduction 
Merger control is an important regulatory component affecting the size and market power 
of firms. With the exception of the United States, Canada and Germany, most industrial 
countries have introduced or strengthened this policy over the last three decades. The 
reforms of merger control legislation have marked an important shift in the economic 
policy of the countries involved as they imply limits on industry structure and firm growth 
in concentration and market shares. 
The importance of merger control has also increased due to the large number and the 
high value of the mergers and acquisitions that took place during the last three decades in 
the United States (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001)) and other countries (Evenett 
(2004)). The European Commission for example adopted final decisions in 270 cases 
during 2010 only, including many that attracted widespread media attention (e.g., Oracle / 
Sun Microsystems, Monsanto / Syngenta and Unilever / Sara Lee Body). The UK Office of 
Fair Trading dealt with 77 cases in the same year.1  
The economic impact of merger control on firms’ valuation is much debated in the 
academic literature. Most studies focus on the effects of actual regulatory actions, such as 
the decision of an antitrust enforcer to investigate a merger proposal in greater detail or to 
impose conditions (Ellert (1976), Aktas, De Bodt and Roll (2004), Aktas, de Bodt and Roll 
(2007), and Duso, Neven and Röller (2007)). Not surprisingly, these studies confirm that 
regulatory actions affect firms’ valuation, but the effects are somewhat mixed in terms of 
their economic relevancy and time of realization. In particular, it remains controversial 
                                                 
1 Merger notification is voluntary in the U.K.. This means that the OFT decides on cases that are either 
voluntarily notified by the parties or are opened on its own initiative. 
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whether all effects on firms’ valuation are anticipated on the announcement day or realized 
later during the antitrust investigation. 
One potential reason for the mixed findings is that these studies only look at the actual 
enforcement of merger policy (an exception is Brady and Feinberg (2000)), thereby 
ignoring the effects that the introduction or changes in the policy itself may have on 
investors’ expectations and thus stock prices. Some studies have indeed shown that the 
effects at the time of regulatory reforms can be important and even larger than those at the 
time of the merger announcements. For example, Becher (2009) finds that this was the case 
with the passage of the Riegle Neal Act of interstate bank deregulation in the US in 1994, 
although the Act itself was the culmination of almost two decades of state-by-state reform 
(Kroszner and Strahan (1999)). Another potential reason for the mixed findings on the 
impact of merger control legislation is that the existing studies do not distinguish across 
different sectors. Therefore, they disregard sector specificities and the potentially important 
interaction between merger control and sector regulation. 
In this paper we contribute to the existing literature by investigating further the economic 
impact of merger control. We focus our analysis on the impact on firms’ valuation of the 
legislative changes introducing or substantially reforming merger control regulation rather 
than of its actual enforcement. As mentioned above, this allows us to measure investors’ 
expectations about the potential future effects of merger control on the competitiveness of 
industries. To do this, we study merger control legislation in detail and we construct a 
unique data set covering 19 industrialized countries over the last three decades. 
To capture potential differences across sectors and the interaction between merger 
control and sector specific regulation, we distinguish between regulated and non-regulated 
sectors. In particular, we analyze separately the effects of the reforms of merger control 
legislation on non-financial firms and banks. Our choice is motivated by the fact that the 
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financial sector – and in particular the banking sector – is the most regulated sector of the 
economy. Banking regulation is pervasive and, differently from the regulation in other 
industries, it includes a specific control of mergers and acquisitions among banks for 
reasons of financial stability. Moreover, as banking regulation dates back in all our sample 
countries to well before the reforms of merger control, the sector is particularly suited to 
analyze the interaction between merger control and sector regulations. 
Our analysis is based on a stock market event study. As a first step, we construct four 
indices that describe the most important institutional characteristics of merger control and 
their variation across country and time. Then, we analyze in an event study the impact of 
the changes in these indices on the stock prices of non-financial firms and banks. In line 
with the monopolistic hypothesis that a properly enforced merger control prevents 
anticompetitive mergers and thus future monopolistic rents (Ellert (1976)), we find that the 
introduction or the strengthening of merger control lead to negative excess returns on the 
stocks of (non-financial) firms. In contrast to this, however, we find that bank stock returns 
are positive. The difference in excess returns on firm and bank stocks is both statistically 
significant and economically relevant, and is robust to the use of either sector price indices 
or firm-level data in the event study. 
To exploit sector characteristics further, we then investigate the reaction of stocks of 
firms in other regulated industries including insurance, telecommunication, utilities and 
healthcare sectors. Again, we find negative excess returns in response to the changes in 
merger control legislation in all sectors except in the insurance sector, where excess returns 
are positive. This suggests that there may be something specific to the financial industry 
that induces investors to react differently. We conjecture that this may be related to the 
characteristics of financial regulation. 
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We then turn again to the banking sector, and perform a cross sectional analysis to 
investigate what can explain the differential effects on firm and bank stocks. In particular, 
we regress individual firm- and bank- stock returns (measured over various event windows) 
on a number of variables describing the main institutional characteristics of the supervisory 
control of mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector, and on a series of other control 
variables capturing the importance of efficiency creation in mergers, the quality of a 
country’s institutions and some firm-specific variables. 
We find that the characteristics of the supervisory control are the main explanatory 
variables of investors’ reactions. In particular, the potential discretion embedded in the 
supervisory control deriving from unspecified valuation criteria and lack of disclosure of 
formal decisions is a key driver of the positive reaction of bank abnormal returns. The more 
the supervisory control can be implemented with discretion and thus create potential for 
abuse of power and wasteful outcomes, the higher is the valuation gains of banks in 
anticipation of changes in merger control. In line with the political economy literature, we 
interpret this result as suggesting that investors anticipate the strengthening of the merger 
control in the banking sector as the creation of a value-increasing “separation of powers” 
and “checks and balances” mechanism to the supervisory control. This discretionary effect 
of banks’ supervisory control is further supported by the analysis of the well-known 
takeover battle that occurred in 2005 between ABN AMRO and Banca Popolare Italiana for 
the control of the Italian bank Antonveneta. 
Our paper makes three distinct contributions to the literature. First, differently from 
existing studies, it constructs a very detailed cross-country data set capturing the main 
institutional characteristics of merger control legislation. The data document the existence 
of considerable variation in the institutional design of merger control across countries and 
time. Second, it studies the impact of legislative changes in merger control on firms’ 
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valuation. Third, it examines and explains how these valuation effects may differ across 
sectors. In particular, we focus on the difference between non-financial firms and banks, 
and we closely investigate the role that banking sector-specific regulation may have in 
explaining these differential effects. Our estimates highlight the importance of sector 
characteristics and existing sector regulation for the effects of legislative changes in merger 
control. 
The paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it fits in a vast literature that 
studies the role of the legal architecture for the functioning of financial systems (La Porta, 
et al. (1998)), including its impact on the volume of M&As and the direction of cross-
border deals (Rossi and Volpin (2004)). Second, it relates to studies by Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2006), Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) and Donzé (2006), which provide evidence that 
excessively restrictive, inefficient or discretionary banking regulation weakens the banking 
sector and leads to substantial welfare costs. Finally, our paper is connected to the literature 
on the “specialness of banks” (Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Goodhart, et al. (1998) and 
Herring and Litan (1995)), competition in banking (Keeley (1990), Hellman, Murdock and 
Stiglitz (2000), Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), Claessens and Laeven (2005) and Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006); see Carletti (2008) for a survey), and the causes and 
consequences of banking consolidation (Berger, et al. (1998)), Boyd and Runkle (1993), 
Demsetz and Strahan (1997),Carletti and Hartmann (2003), and Carletti, Hartmann and 
Spagnolo (2007); see Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) for a survey). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes briefly the history 
and institutional arrangements of merger control, and it describes the main economic 
hypothesis driving the evaluation of its economic impact. Section 3 describes the data and 
the methodology we use in our econometric exercise. Section 4 reports the estimated effects 
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of the changes in merger control on firms and banks, discusses a cross sectional analysis 
showing the importance of the characteristics of the supervisory control in determining the 
stock market valuations across the sample countries, and provides a case-study further 
supporting our findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Merger Control: History and Hypothesis 
2.1. History 
The reform of merger control legislation offers a unique opportunity to study the 
economic impact of regulatory reforms on firms’ valuation. With the exception of the 
United States, where regulatory limits on industry concentration existed already in 1914 
(e.g., Eckbo (1992)), Germany, where it was formalized in the “Act against Restraints on 
Competition” in 1973, and Canada, where the Federal Competition Act in its present form 
was adopted in 1986, most industrial countries introduced or reformed merger control 
starting in the early 1990s. Since then, merger control became an important regulatory tool 
for the development and functioning of industries in these countries. 
As a regulation limiting anticompetitive effects of mergers and acquisitions, merger 
control is a tool of competition policy. However, in most countries it was introduced later 
than legislation covering antitrust practices through a separate law or it was the most 
significant change in subsequent modifications of an already existing antitrust act. For 
example, the European Union introduced merger control explicitly only in 1989, whereas 
the regulation on anticompetitive behavior and abuse of dominant position dates back to the 
Treaty of Rome of 1957. Similarly, Austria and Portugal introduced merger control in 1993 
and 2003, whereas the competition acts date back to 1988 and 1983, respectively. In 
Denmark merger control was introduced de facto in 2000 as part of a law modifying the 
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competition act of 1989. In Finland the chapter on merger control was written into the 
competition act of 1992 only in 1998. 
This history makes it possible to isolate the specific effects of reforms in merger control 
from those of other antitrust regulation. Moreover, the reforms of merger control seem to be 
well defined also in terms of identification of the relevant events. Most of the countries in 
our study did not experience other industry or country specific events in the same time 
period when the reform of merger control legislation occurred. This allows us to identify 
the reforms of merger control legislation as the relevant events driving the results of our 
study. Finally, as a general regulation affecting all sectors, the reforms of merger control in 
our sample countries were most likely exogenous to existing regulations or occurrences in 
any particular industry.2 Thus, they are well suited to examine how a general policy change 
may have different effects across sectors depending on their characteristics and regulation. 
 2.2. Economic Hypothesis 
There is a long-standing debate about the objective of merger control and its 
effectiveness. The debate centers on the goals of antitrust regulation and the reasons why 
companies find it profitable to merge (e.g., Ellert (1976), Eckbo (1983), Eckbo (1992), 
Brady and Feinberg (2000), Aktas, De Bodt and Roll (2004)). 
According to the so-called “monopolistic hypothesis” (Ellert (1976)), mergers, 
particularly when involving large companies, are likely to be motivated by considerations 
of monopoly power or other anticompetitive advantages associated with increases in size 
                                                 
2 It is likely that no sector can decisively lobby and induce a change of merger control that is applicable to all 
sectors. Lobbying could occur, for example, in expectation of positive valuation effects. In terms of the results 
that we present later, it is important that the reforms of merger controls are not induced by lobbying by the 
banking sector. It is possible to show that the results do not differ between countries with large versus small 
banking sectors (proxied by total bank credit / GDP, with a cutoff of 150 percent). Interpreting the size of the 
banking sector as a possible measure of lobbying power, we conclude that the reforms of merger control are 
not induced by the lobbying in this sector. 
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and market shares. By contrast, according to the so- called “benign merger” hypothesis, 
companies merge to realize efficiency gains and eliminate redundancies. 
Both types of mergers improve companies’ profits and thus stockholders’ returns. 
However, mergers motivated by monopoly power are anticompetitive as they lead to higher 
output prices and lower consumer welfare; while those creating substantial efficiency gains 
are pro-competitive and beneficial to consumers.3 The objective of merger control is to 
prohibit mergers or acquisition producing anticompetitive effects and thus harm to 
consumers. The emphasis in the merger regulation on market share as a criterion to discern 
anticompetitive effects varies across jurisdictions. For example, in the United States, the 
Clayton Act prohibits mergers or acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition or 
tend to create a monopoly. In Europe, the Council Regulation No 4064/89 prohibits 
concentrations which create or strengthen a dominant position as result of which effective 
competition would be significantly impeded.4 In line with the monopolistic hypothesis 
described above, the concern is that excessive concentration may cause a substantial 
lessening of competition or the creation of a dominant position, which may increase prices 
and reduce consumer welfare. 
This implies that, if effectively enforced, merger control should prevent concentrations 
leading to substantial reductions of competition, while it should allow those producing 
sufficient efficiency gains to bring benefits to consumers and the economy. This means that 
merger control should limits firms’ external growth and profit possibilities, if generated by 
excessive market power. If this is anticipated by investors, the introduction of merger 
                                                 
3 Evidence is mixed on what type of mergers is more likely to occur in practice. Results depend on the 
valuation method used and the industry considered (Singal (1996)). 
4 The Council Regulation No 139/2004 modifies the previous regulation by prohibiting concentrations which 
would significantly impede effective competition, in the common market, in particular as a result of the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Similarly, the national legislation in various European 
countries stresses the importance of the market share of the new entity as a potential indication that the 
concentration will have anticompetitive effects. 
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control or of reforms strengthening leads to a decline in companies’ stock value relative to 
the situation where merger control is absent. Such an effect will be more pronounced for 
those companies most likely to be involved in (large) mergers (see also Brady and Feinberg 
(2000)).5 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data Collection 
We use an event study approach to analyze the effects of the introduction or 
modifications in merger control in numerous industrial countries over the period January 1, 
1987 to July 1, 2004. In order to identify the events, we collect detailed information on the 
legislative changes affecting the institutional design of merger policy in the European 
Union (EU) and 18 individual countries: the United States and Canada, 14 EU countries, 
including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and two additional non-
EU countries, Switzerland and Norway.6 
In the collection of the institutional data, we relied on multiple sources. In a first step, we 
analyzed the text of all relevant legislation and regulation to identify the legal arrangements 
of the merger control in each country and the changes that took place over time. In a second 
step, we examined the many publicly available reports on merger control to check our 
interpretation of the events (Appendix 1 contains a comprehensive list). Finally, we 
contacted experts of the various institutions dealing with merger control across all countries 
                                                 
5 An alternative possibility is that the anticipation of stringent merger control enforcement induces companies 
to become more efficient, thus potentially increasing their stock value. However, there is evidence that 
antitrust policy does not produce efficiency gains (Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000)). 
6 In European Union countries a two-layer regime is in place for the competition review of concentrations. All 
mergers with a ‘community dimension’ are examined by the European Commission, whereas transactions 
without ‘community dimension’ are left to the competent national authorities. The dividing line between the 
two cases is drawn on the basis of the size and geographical dispersion of turnovers. 
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(Appendix 2 contains the list of agencies we contacted). We communicated extensively 
with them to confirm our understanding and “coding” of the data, to seek clarifications and 
corrections, and to identify the most important aspects of merger control in practice. Our 
efforts resulted in a unique data set covering a wide range of information about merger 
control and documenting important cross-country and time-wise variation. 
3.2. Institutional Variables 
A key contribution of the paper is to aggregate and code the institutional information we 
collected. We capture the main features of the design of merger control through four 
variables that vary across country and time: Criteria, Enforcer, Overturning, and 
Mandatory Notification. These variables are formulated as the answers to four questions: 
1. What assessment criteria are used in merger control? 
2. Who is (are) the decision-making agency(ies) for merger control?  
3. Can a third agency intervene in the process to replace / overturn the decision-
making agency(ies)? 
4. Is merger notification mandatory above (statutory) thresholds? 
The variable Criteria measures whether criteria other than competition are considered in 
the review of M&As. Examples are general or public interests, preservation of employment 
or international competitiveness of the national industry. The idea is that when these other 
objectives are taken into account (e.g., Austria, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and UK till 2002), 
the enforcement of merger control is likely to be weakened in the sense of being less 
competition oriented. 
The second variable, defined as Enforcer, captures the identity of the authority in charge 
of merger control. In most jurisdictions (e.g., Austria, Belgium, EU, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland since 2002, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal since 2003, Switzerland) an independent 
antitrust authority or a court is in charge of merger control. In others (e.g., Canada, 
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Denmark, Finland, Sweden, UK and US), the decision-making power is shared among 
several authorities. Yet in some other countries (e.g., France and Spain), a political body 
enforces merger control. The idea is that merger control is more likely to be effectively 
implemented when the enforcer is an independent antitrust authority or a court rather than a 
political body. 
The variable Overturning measures whether another authority can intervene, take over 
the review process or overturn the decisions of the agency enforcing merger control for 
reasons other than competition. This is the case for example in Germany, where the 
Ministry of Economics may clear a concentration prohibited by the competition authority if 
the restraint of competition is outweighed by public interest or advantages to the economy 
as a whole. Similar procedures exist in Belgium, the EU, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Switzerland and the UK since 2002. The potential interference of another 
authority is likely to weaken the enforcement of merger control, similarly to when criteria 
other than competition are taken into account in merger decisions. 
The last variable, defined as Mandatory Notification, measures whether a merger must be 
notified to the competent authority (if above a certain size) or whether notification is 
voluntary, as is the case in the UK and in Norway till 2004. The idea is that mandatory 
notification is associated with a stricter enforcement of merger control. 
All variables range between 0 and 1, with higher values corresponding to a more 
competition-oriented design and enforcement of merger control. Changes in any of the four 
institutional variables during the sample period define our set of events. These are shown in 
Table 1 for the countries we analyze. As the values in the table shows, in most instances the 
event consists in the introduction of merger control in a country and as such it affects all the 
variables describing merger control (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, EU, Finland, Greece, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway in 1993, Spain in 1989, Sweden in 1992 and Switzerland). In a 
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few other cases, the event captures a reform changing the existing merger regulation, thus 
affecting only some of the variables (e.g., France, Ireland, Norway in 2004, Portugal, Spain 
in 1999, Sweden in 2000, and the UK). This underlines the importance of carefully 
analyzing the institutional details of merger control and their variation over time.7 
3.3. Dating 
The precise dating of the change in investors’ expectations in legislative event studies is 
of paramount importance (Schwert (1981), Binder (1985)). To tackle this issue, we study 
the legislative process in detail. We first divide it into two phases: approval and publication, 
as described in Figure 1. Approval refers to the date of approval by either the Parliament or 
the Head of State. When available, we collect this as the earliest date in the official 
approval process. In a bi-cameral parliamentary system, for example, we use the date when 
the first chamber approves the law. Publication refers to the date when the legislation is 
published in the country’s official journal. 
Second, to capture the earliest time when investors can reasonably be expected to infer 
reforms in the merger control legislation, we study the stock price reaction around the 
earliest official date of the legislative process that we collect. This coincided with the 
approval date (typically by the Head of State) in some countries, and with the publication 
date in others. As shown in Figure 1, we then obtain 20 Event dates as deriving from 16 
approval dates and 4 publication dates. This methodology allows us to take account of the 
heterogeneity in the codification of the legislative process across countries and harmonize 
the information investors have about its outcome. Neglecting these differences across 
                                                 
7 Note that there were no changes in merger control during the sample period and hence there are no events 
for Germany, Canada and the US. 
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countries entails the risk of analyzing investors’ reactions to widely divergent information 
sets. 
3.4. Event Windows and Confounding Effects 
We analyze the impact of the introduction or modifications of merger control on the 
stocks of the firms around the event dates identified above. In particular, we analyze 
investors’ reactions during an adequate period preceding them, i.e., we study event 
windows that commence 120, 60, and 20 days prior to the event (and also include the 
event). Using large windows allows us to capture investors’ potential reactions during the 
whole parliamentary process. Major legislative changes such as the reform of merger 
control legislation involve indeed long and partially public discussions during which there 
may be significant information leakages to the market. 
While considering large event windows is essential in an event study looking at the 
impact of legislative reforms, it may, however, cast doubt on the absence of confounding 
effects and hence the interpretation of the estimated excess returns. To address this issue, 
we investigate the presence of confounding effects from other events that may take place 
during the studied event windows (McWilliams and Siegel (1997)). In particular, we check 
whether any confounding events such as macroeconomic shocks, introduction of sector 
specific regulations and large privations occurred in our sample countries in the same time 
period when the reforms of merger control legislation took place. We then assess the 
importance of these confounding events for our events. 
The result of our assessment process for each of the exact event dates is reported in Table 
2. The vast majority of countries did not experience any major confounding event. In only 
three countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) potentially important confounding events in 
the form of privatization programs took place during our sample period (but results are 
unaffected by their exclusion). We conclude that the reforms in merger control legislation 
 14 
 
are well defined events and can be interpreted as the driving force behind the changes in 
firms’ stock prices. 
3.5. Event Study Methodology 
We base our analysis of the impact of the reforms in merger control legislation on a stock 
market event study. We start by examining separately the impact on the stock prices of non-
financial firms and banks. Then, we examine the reaction of other regulated industries. The 
aim is to examine whether merger control may have different effects in industries that are 
also subject to sector specific regulation. In all the event studies that we conduct, we 
analyze the effects of our relevant events on daily sector price indices as well as on firm-
level stock prices. All series are from Datastream.8 The sector indices capture all listed 
firms in the respective category and are value-weighted. 
We estimate daily abnormal returns using standard market model regressions. We regress 
the daily returns for index or stock j, rjt, on a measure of the market return, rmt, and two 
event dummies, beforet  and aftert , that take the value of one when day t is inside the event 
windows [-, 0] and [1, ] respectively, and zero otherwise: 
jt
after
t
after
j
before
t
before
jmtjjjt rr   ,   (1) 
t = -250-, -249-, ..., 249+, 250+. 
We analyze  equal to 20, 60 and 120. The coefficients beforej  and afterj measure daily 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the event periods before and after the event. 
The market model is estimated over a period starting (-250-) days before the event and 
                                                 
8 The bank indices have the Datastream code BANKSCC, where CC stands for the respective two-digit 
country code. The non-financial sector indices have the code TOTLICC. The total market indices are labeled 
TOTMKCC. 
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ending (250+) days after the event.9 As a proxy for the market return we include the value-
weighted index of all stocks in the country (for the EU we employ the EU-15 Market 
Index) and the Morgan Stanley All Country World Index.10 For each event the CARs are 
the estimated coefficients beforejˆ  and afterjˆ . 
For each event we estimate daily abnormal returns for both indices and stocks. We 
calculate the mean and standard deviations of the CARs across the set of events and 
perform a standard t-test to assess statistical significance. We also report the number of 
positives and negatives and perform a standard non-parametric sign test assuming an equal 
binomial probability of occurrence for the number of positives versus negatives. This test 
does not require the abnormal returns to have the same variance or to be normally 
distributed and is unaffected by outliers. In a second step (and as recommended by 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) for example), we regress the daily abnormal returns of the 
firm and bank stocks cross-sectional on measures capturing the potential discretion 
embedded in the supervisory control in each country. 
To start with, we assess the (null) hypothesis that the exact event dates are randomly 
distributed across the entire sample period to address the potential concern of the 
independence of the events (which could give rise to clustering in time). We cannot reject 
the random distribution of the events across the sample period. For the EU countries we 
further check the distribution across the period starting on December 21, 1989, of the 
                                                 
9 We a priori choose for a long estimation window around the event, as we are concerned about the impact of 
the changes in regulation on market risk (Grout and Zalewska (2006)). We check the robustness of the results 
to alternative estimation windows, the (-250-, ) window for example, and time-varying market betas. In 
particular we estimate the beta coefficients using only pre-event stock returns. Again, results are unaffected 
and we choose not to report these findings. 
10 In unreported robustness we replace all country indices with the EU-15 Market Index, and exclude the 
Morgan Stanley All Country World Index. Results are unaffected. We also conduct the event study using 
reasonable combinations of the domestic, EU-15, and world indices with the MS All Country Non Financial 
Index and the MS All Country Bank Index. Results are again almost unaffected. 
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approval date for EU competition legislation, but again we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Finally, we regress the CARs in various specifications on a time trend, to see if 
investor expectations are affected by the relative time of the introduction of merger control 
in each country (which could be indicative of the lack of independence of the events). 
Again we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the trend variables are 
equal to zero. To conclude, the data are consistent with the events being independent. 
4. The Impact of Changes in Merger Control 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
The results of the event study for both the stock indices and the individual stock prices of 
non-financial firms and banks assessed across events are reported in Table 3. Indices differ 
from individual stocks in terms of coverage, selection, and relevant value weighting. 
Analyzing both is therefore informative. For brevity, we report only selected windows 
around the legislative changes as identified by the event dates. We assess the results 
broadly across all events, time windows, and estimates. 
We note two important results. First, most of the statistically significant results lie in the 
windows before (and including) the event date. As described before, we select the earliest 
available date of the legislative process as the event date and we expect the most significant 
reaction to occur before this date. The results are broadly consistent with this and thus 
confirm the accurateness of the dates we use (Schwert (1981), Binder (1985)). There are 
sporadically some significant reactions in the windows following the event dates. This may 
reflect the fact that in some cases the formal end of the legislative process may remove 
remaining uncertainties about the actual modus operandi of the new legislation. 
Second, moving to the analysis of the results, Table 3 shows that the reforms of merger 
control legislation have important economic effects that differ between the non-financial 
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and the banking sector. Changes in merger control lead on average to a decrease in firms’ 
stock prices but to an increase in banks’ stock prices. This result holds when we conduct 
the event study using the industry as unit of observation as well as when we employ firm-
level data. The negative effect on firms is in line with our hypothesis as described in 
Section 2.2, but the positive effect on banks is not. 
The difference between the reactions of bank and firm stock prices is positive and 
statistically significant. We assess this key difference in three different ways. First, we 
perform a t-test assuming unequal variances on the difference in mean CARs on bank and 
firm indices or individual bank and firm stocks. Second, we conduct a Mann Whitney 
Wilcoxon test to assess the difference in median CARs on individual bank and firm stocks. 
Third, we report the Pearson value of the Chi-Square test for the number of bank positives 
and negatives versus firm positives and negatives (in terms of CARs), for either the bank 
and firm indices or individual bank and firm stocks. 
The difference between the reactions of banks and firms is also economically relevant. 
For example, in the 20, 60 and 120-day windows before and including the event date the 
difference in mean CARs equal 3.3**, 7.5*** and 10.4* percent for the indices, and -0.5, 
2.3* and 7.5*** percent for the individual stocks.11 Firm and bank stocks differ 
significantly also in the direction of their reaction. For the [-120, 0] window for example 12 
bank index CARs are positive and 8 are negative, while 12 firm index CARs are negative 
and 8 are positive. Similarly, 77 individual bank stock CARs are positive and 54 are 
negative, while 964 individual firm stock CARs are negative and 771 are positive. Similar 
results hold for the other event windows. 
                                                 
11 *** Significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, and * significant at 10 percent. For convenience we 
will also indicate the significance levels of the estimates that are mentioned further in the text. 
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In Table 3 we also investigate the difference in reactions for large and small banks and 
firms (the median size by total assets in each group is the cut-off). We find that the 
difference in CARs between small banks and firms is somewhat larger than the one 
between large banks and firms. This result highlights yet another difference between the 
banking and the non-financial sector. 
To investigate further the impact of merger control reforms across different industries, in 
Table 4 we investigate the reaction of firms’ individual stocks in other regulated sectors, 
i.e., the insurance, telecommunication, utilities and healthcare sector. The results are 
interesting. Excess returns are positive and significant in the insurance sector, which is the 
sector closest in activity and regulation to banking, while they are mostly negative in the 
other three sectors.12 The different reaction of stocks in the banking and insurance sectors 
suggest that there may be something specific to the financial industry that may interfere 
with merger control. We now turn to analyze the specificity of the financial industry more 
in depth. In particular, we examine whether banking regulation may explain the positive 
impact of the reforms of merger control legislation on banks’ stock prices. 
4.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 Why do banks react differently to the reforms of merger control legislation? As in 
the other sectors, also in the banking industry, the introduction or the strengthening of 
merger control should lead to a more effective prevention of anticompetitive mergers, and 
thus to a reduction of future profits and stock prices. Why don’t we see this reflected in 
bank investors’ reactions? 
                                                 
12 Similar results are obtained when using returns for indices. However, we choose not to report these 
estimates as indices are not consistently defined and available across countries and time. We also study large 
and small firms in each sector (and many other sectors) but find no immediate differences. To conserve space 
these results are left unreported. 
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To tackle this question, we investigate several economic hypotheses which may explain 
the positive reaction in banks’ stock prices. Our focus is on a unique feature of the banking 
sector, namely the existence of a prudential supervisory control of M&As among banks. 
Whilst such a regulation is (at least partly) present in the insurance sector, it is absent in 
other, non-financial sectors, even if regulated. The regulation of sectors like 
telecommunications, utilities or healthcare concerns in fact more general aspects of firm 
behavior, product standards, access to networks or pricing, but it does not have any role in 
the approval of M&As in these sectors. 
In addition to prudential regulation, in our regressions we also consider other variables 
capturing some institutional aspects of merger control, country institutional quality, sector 
concentration measures and bank characteristics. Whereas our goal is to analyze the reasons 
behind the positive response in banks’ stock prices upon legislative changes in merger 
control, in one robustness test we use firms’ individual CARs as explanatory variable to 
control for any potential omitted variables bias. 
We discuss below our economic hypotheses and the variables we use to assess them in 
the cross-sectional exercises. Table 5 describes all the variables and their summary 
statistics, showing a high variability of the variables across countries. Table 6 reports the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients among our explanatory variables. 
4.2.1. Supervisory Control of M&As in the Banking Sector 
A striking feature of the banking sector is the existence of a very specific and pervasive 
sector regulation and supervision having as its main goal the stability of the system. In 
particular for the purpose of our study, bank M&As are subject to a supervisory control that 
aims to ensure the soundness and stability of the newly created entities. Such control 
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requires that the new entity is well capitalized, has a good quality of assets, a good earnings 
performance, suitable shareholders, etc.13 
The supervisory control of bank M&As dates back to well before the relevant legislative 
events in our sample countries. This means that the legislative reforms in merger control 
introduced (or strengthened) a second form of control in the banking sector. In contrast to 
any other non-financial sector, M&As among banks had to be cleared both from a 
competition and a supervisory perspective. For this double control to explain the positive 
change in banks’ stock prices in our event study, it must be that investors anticipate that the 
reforms of the merger control will improve the way the supervisory control is enforced and 
thus the overall efficiency of the banking sector. This hypothesis requires explaining and 
measuring why the supervisory control may be regarded by investors as been detrimental to 
banks’ stocks; and how the introduction of the strengthening of a regulatory agency in 
charge of merger control can improve upon having a single prudential regulator. We start 
by describing briefly the relationship between the two forms of control. Then, we look at 
some institutional characteristics of the supervisory control that can explain potential 
inefficiencies in its enforcement. 
The relationship between the supervisory and merger controls varies across jurisdictions. 
In most countries, the responsible agencies share the control in that each of them has to 
approve the transaction according to its respective mandate. In others (e.g., the 
Netherlands), a third body, typically a minister or the government, decides upon any 
                                                 
13 For example, the Core Principles 4 and 5 for Effective Banking Supervision issued by the 
Basel_Committee_on_Banking_Supervision (1997) state that supervisors must establish criteria for 
reviewing, and eventually reject, changes in ownerships and major acquisitions by banks. The goal is to 
ensure that the new structure does not lead to undue risks or hinder effective supervision. Factors that are 
considered include ownership structures, operating plan, systems of control and internal organization, fit and 
proper tests of directors and senior managers, and financial projections including capital. For more details on 
the supervisory control of bank M&As in the U.S. see the Bank Merger Act, §128 and the Bank Holding 
Company Act, §1842, and European_Council (1989), article 5, for Europe. 
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conflicts between the two responsible authorities. Yet, in some others (e.g., Canada and 
Switzerland), the supervisory control may prevail, particularly when the merger helps 
protect the interests of creditors or the general interests of the domestic financial sector. 
Finally, in countries like Italy until 2005 and the US the supervisory agency is also 
responsible for the merger control of bank M&As.14 
In all these circumstances – possibly to a different extent depending on the precise 
institutional design – the presence of an agency responsible for merger control is likely to 
affect the way in which the review of bank M&As is conducted and its outcome. Thus, to 
the extent that investors perceive the supervisory control as a value-decreasing mechanism, 
the introduction or strengthening of merger control may be seen as a mechanism that 
creates a “separation of powers” in the regulation of bank mergers and thus reduces the 
discretion for the prudential regulator to take wasteful decisions (e.g., Laffont and 
Martimort (1999)), or improves its accountability through a process of “checks and 
balances” (e.g., Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997)). The idea is that a single 
(nonbenevolent) regulatory agency can be subject to abuse of power if it can use its 
discretion and the private information it obtains on the regulated firms to pursue personal 
agendas and take wasteful decisions. In this case, creating a separation of powers between 
two institutions that take separate decisions but have access to the same (or parts of the 
same) information and have to agree on the final outcome − in our case, whether to approve 
the merger − limits the scope for abuse of power and increases the likelihood of more value 
enhancing bank M&As. 
                                                 
14 In the U.S. the Department of Justice may challenge the decision of the central bank in court, while in Italy 
the competition authority is only requested to issue an opinion on the transaction. The institutional 
arrangement in Italy was reformed in 2005 after the ABN AMRO-Antonveneta case. See Section 4.3 for a 
detailed analysis of this case. 
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To see why investors may perceive the supervisory control as a value-decreasing 
mechanism, we now analyze its institutional design more in detail. We notice that various 
institutional elements are not well specified so that there is potential scope for discretion 
and abuse of power in the implementation of the supervisory control. For example, the 
criteria for evaluating bank M&As are often left unspecified so that they can be interpreted 
widely, in particular when the supervisory control pursues objectives other than the stability 
of the new entity. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that in most jurisdictions 
decisions adopted in the supervisory review of bank M&As are not made public. This 
reduces the accountability of prudential authorities and leaves room for abuses or misuses 
by the supervisory agency. 
We measure the potential discretion embedded in a given supervisory control system 
through various variables – each ranging from 0 and 1 – that capture its main institutional 
features. We then consolidate these measures into an index representing the average degree 
of potential discretion of the supervisory control. The first two variables, denoted as 
Supervisory Criteria and Supervisory Enforcer, measure the strength of the stability 
objective in the supervisory control of bank M&As. The former takes higher values when 
the supervisory review takes into account also criteria other than ensuring stability such as 
the “convenience and needs of the community to be served” in the US. The latter captures 
the identity of the authority in charge of the prudential control. The idea is that a ministry, a 
central bank (having also other objectives), or a combination of them, may be less focused 
on stability considerations than an independent supervisor. Thus, higher values of both 
variables may indicate a greater potential for discretion in the enforcement of the 
supervisory control of bank M&As. 
To next two variables capture the degree of transparency of supervisory control. The first 
one, denoted as Supervisory Formal Decision Not Public, measures the extent to which the 
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decisions taken by the responsible agencies have to be made public. The second variable, 
i.e., Supervisory Informal Notification, measures whether either by regulation or imposed 
de facto banks planning to merge have to notify the supervisor informally of their intentions 
before starting the formal procedure. Higher values of both of these variables correspond to 
greater opaqueness in the prudential control and thus to potentially more discretion and 
abuse in its implementation. 
To the extent that the reforms of merger control legislation help reduce the political 
discretion embedded in the supervisory control and implement more value-enhancing 
mergers, we expect the coefficients of all the four supervisory variables to be positive in 
our regressions. To sidestep in our estimations the possible problems of multicollinearity, 
as captured by the high positive correlation coefficients among the four supervisory 
variables shown in Table 6, we further aggregate these variables in one index denoted as 
Mean of Supervisory Strength Indices. Again we expect its sign to be positive in the 
regressions. 
4.2.2. Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 
Some characteristics of merger control may also help explain bank CARs in our event 
study. As mentioned above, mergers can be motivated by the exercise of market power or 
economic synergies deriving from the creation of efficiencies. Merger control shall 
challenge the former types of mergers, but not the latter.  
In recent decades, there has been an increasing recognition of the creation of efficiencies 
in the review of mergers and in some jurisdictions they have been formally incorporated in 
the merger regulation as a factor mitigating potential anticompetitive effects of mergers. 
When this is the case, merger control becomes less stringent in that profit-enhancing 
mergers are not challenged if they generate sufficient efficiencies to reverse the potential to 
harm to consumers. 
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To control for this, we construct the variable defined as Efficiency Defense that equals 
one if efficiency gains are explicitly considered in the merger review as a factor mitigating 
anticompetitive effects, and equals zero otherwise.15 The hypothesis is that of a positive 
coefficient on this variable. To the extent that banks can claim more than non-financial 
firms that mergers lead to important efficiency gains,16 they may be subject to a less 
stringent merger control than other industries and thus benefit more (or be hurt less) from 
the reform of merger control.  
4.2.3. Other Institutional and Firm-specific Characteristics 
One important issue is whether the positive bank CARs may be driven by other country 
characteristics, such as the general quality of governmental and regulatory institutions 
rather than by institutional features specific to the competition and supervisory policies. In 
order to check this, we introduce the variable Bureaucracy Quality that accounts for the 
strength and expertise of the national bureaucracy; and the variable Corruption that 
accounts for the degree to which bribes, nepotism and ties between politics and business are 
prevalent in a given country. As shown in Table 6, both variables are negatively correlated 
with the supervisory variables and their mean, suggesting that in countries with better 
bureaucratic quality and less corruption also the supervisory control tends to be better in 
terms of objectives, enforcer and transparency. This suggests that both of these institutional 
variables should have a negative sign in our regression, since the potential benefit of 
merger control for bank stock prices should be lower in countries where institutions are of 
good quality and corruption is limited. 
                                                 
15 This variable captures only the situation where the efficiency defense is explicitly incorporated in the 
merger regulation. The case where the efficiency defense is only implicitly and informally used is not 
captured by our variable. 
16 The empirical evidence on the ability of banks to generate efficiencies through mergers is mixed. Few 
studies find that banks are able to generate scale efficiencies even at larger sizes (e.g., Berger and Mester 
(1997) and Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001)) and as result of mergers (Focarelli and Panetta (2003)). 
 25 
 
Certain sector and bank characteristics may also contribute to explain excess returns. For 
example, a greater level of sector concentration at the time of the legislative change can be 
seen as a proxy for the tightness of merger control if associated with lower competition and 
greater potential for anticompetitive mergers. To see if this is the case, we measure sector 
concentration by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Bank Sector HHI), which is calculated 
as the sum of the squared shares of the exchange-listed banks by stock market 
capitalization, and we expect it to have a negative sign in our regressions. 
Bank size may also contribute to explain excess returns. Large banks should be more hit 
by a stringent merger control regime if their large size is a proxy for greater market power, 
while smaller banks should eventually benefit from a more competitive environment. By 
contrast, if bank mergers are driven by managerial hubris rather than by value enhancing 
considerations (Berger, et al. (2007)), then investors, especially at the largest banks, should 
benefit from the tightening of merger control if this limits the wasteful merger plans of 
these banks. To control for these possibilities, we include as Bank Size the market 
capitalization of the bank, and the interaction of sector concentration with bank size (Bank 
Sector HHI * Bank Size). We expect the sign of both variables to depend on which of these 
two hypotheses dominates. 
4.2.4. Results 
Table 7 reports the results of the various specifications. In Models I to VII the dependent 
variable in the linear models is the percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 
exchange-listed banks within an event window that starts 20, 60 or 120 days prior to the 
 26 
 
event day and runs until (and includes) the event day. As a robustness test, in Models VIII 
to X we use CARS for exchange-listed firms.17 All errors are clustered at the event level. 
The results are consistent with our main hypothesis. As the results of Models I-VII show, 
the characteristics of the supervisory control consistently matter for investors’ reactions and 
bank CARs. Investors seem to anticipate the strengthening of the merger control in the 
banking sector as the introduction of a positive mechanism of separation of powers and 
checks and balances to the supervisory control. The positive coefficients on the supervisory 
variables suggest that this effect is more pronounced the greater the potential discretion 
embedded in the enforcement of the supervisory control. The finding is robust across every 
individual measure of supervisory strength, holds for the 20 and 60 day windows, and is 
independent of the inclusion of the various controls (the estimated coefficients on these 
controls themselves are hardly ever statistically significant). 
The estimated coefficients also indicate the economic relevance of the results. For 
example, an increase of a standard deviation in the mean of the supervisory indices 
increases the bank CARs by 439 and 502 basis points in the 20 and 60 day windows, 
respectively (= 15.14 * 0.29; =17.34 * 0.29).  
None of the other explanatory variables turns out to be statistically significant and 
economic relevant. The coefficient of the variable Efficiency Defense changes sign in the 
various specifications and is (marginally) significant only in the 120 day window. This 
suggests that investors do not anticipate banks to be able to generate significant efficiencies 
from mergers. 
Although not significant, the broadly negative sign of the coefficient on Bureaucracy 
Quality is in line with our prediction that in countries with better general institutions, bank 
                                                 
17 In these specifications, concentration is calculated per country for each sector as defined by the three-digit 
Industry Classification Benchmark code provided by Datastream; and size refers to firm size. 
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CARs react less positively to the strengthening of merger control. By contrast, the 
coefficient of the variable Corruption changes sign. The insignificance of both of these 
variables reinforces our main result that the specific features of the competition and 
supervisory policies –and not the general quality of governmental and regulatory 
institutions– drive the positive bank CARs. 
The sign of the coefficient on the concentration variable is consistent with the prediction 
of more stringent enforcement of merger control in more concentrated countries, while that 
of the variables Bank Size and Bank Sector HHI * Bank Size gives some support to the 
hubris hypothesis. However, the very weak significance of these coefficients prevents us 
from drawing any conclusions, and it rather suggests that concentration and size may not be 
good proxies for the strength of competition and market power (e.g., Carletti (2010), and 
Antitrust_Modernization_Commission (2007)). 
 The results of Models VIII-X reported in the last three columns of Table 7 are also 
interesting. First, they show that the Mean of Supervisory Indices does not have strong and 
consistent effects on firm CARs (and results are qualitatively similar if we include the 
individual supervisory indices one by one), whereas Corruption has consistent negative sign 
and stronger significance.18 This brings further support to our hypothesis on the explanatory 
power of the characteristics of the supervisory control for bank CARs. Second, the stronger 
significance and the positive sign of the coefficient on the Efficiency Defense variable 
suggest that investors perceive mergers among firms to produce stronger efficiencies than 
mergers among banks (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999)).19 
                                                 
18 These results are further robust to variations in the sets of independent variables that are included and to the 
replacement of Firm Sector HHI by industry fixed effects. 
19 One explanation for this is that some efficiency gains seem to take a long time to materialize in the banking 
sector (Focarelli and Panetta (2003)), possibly due to the acute difficulties integrating different institutions 
(Vander Vennet (2002)). 
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4.3. Case Study 
We now analyze in detail the takeover battle that took place in 2005 between the Dutch 
bank ABN AMRO and the Italian Banca Popolare Italiana (BPI) for the control of the 
Banca Antoniana Popolare Veneta (Antonveneta). This case study provides a unique 
opportunity to assess the effects of the discretion embedded in the supervisory control of 
bank mergers on bank stock prices.20 
The proposed takeover was subject to the competitive control of the European 
Commission as well as the supervisory control of the Bank of Italy. Whereas the 
Commission cleared the proposal takeover by ABN AMRO, the Bank of Italy tried 
repeatedly to wield its supervisory power to favor the bid of BPI. The case attracted 
substantial media attention, as many political and regulatory bodies intervened to limit the 
power and the decisions of the Bank of Italy. The battle led to a profound reform of the 
governance of the Bank of Italy and of the control of bank M&As in Italy. 
Figure 2 plots the cumulative abnormal returns on the Italian bank stock index in the year 
2005. The vertical arrows in the figure point to key dates representing crucial events during 
the takeover battle (Appendix 3 describes all the events). As the figure shows, the Italian 
bank stock index started increasing after February 8, when the EU Commissioner for the 
Internal Market, Mr. McCreevy, publicly warned the Governor of the Bank of Italy, Mr. 
Fazio, not to block foreign bank takeovers. The index continued increasing after any other 
intervention, such as the intervention of the Italian Prime Minister on September 23, aimed 
at limiting the power and the decisions of the Bank of Italy. The run-up of bank stock prices 
terminated with the resignation of Mr. Fazio on December 19, and the passage two days 
                                                 
20 Another example of the discretion embedded in the supervisory control and of how merger control can help 
reducing the abuse of the prudential controls is the Champalimaud-Santander case in 1999 (e.g., Veron 
(2008)). 
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later of a law that reformed the organization of the Bank of Italy and transferred the 
responsibility for the competition reviews of bank mergers from the supervisor to the 
Italian antitrust authority. 
To analyze the reaction of the Italian bank stock prices to the events during the 
Antonveneta case, we perform an event study around them and we report the results in the 
table placed below Figure 2. In particular, we regress daily bank stock index returns on a 
constant, daily national market index returns, and event period dummies for a three-year 
estimation period between March 16, 2002 and March 15, 2006. As the event study shows, 
bank stock prices reacted positively during the takeover battle after the Commissioner’s call 
in early February 2005 which presumably represented a signal for investors of a future 
change in the supervisory control in Italy. Such a change was effectively implemented in 
December 2005, and in anticipation of this, the increase in bank stock prices became more 
pronounced. 
In sum, the Antonveneta case provides further support for our results that bank investors’ 
regard the potential discretion embedded in the supervisory control of bank mergers as not 
being value-enhancing. And investors react positively to events – such as legislative 
changes – that limit it. 
5. Conclusion 
In the last three decades merger control has been introduced or substantially strengthened 
in many developed countries. In this paper we construct an event study around the 
announcements of the legislative reforms of merger control in a sample of nineteen 
industrial countries over the period 1987-2004. The results confirm that such reforms have 
a significant economic impact on firms’ valuation. In line with the standard monopolistic 
hypothesis that merger control should challenge anticompetitive mergers and thus limit 
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firms’ future profits if generated by greater market power, stock prices of (non-financial) 
firms react negatively to the announcement of pro-competitive changes in merger control. 
However, in contrast to non-financials, bank stock prices react positively. 
The cross-sectional exercises suggest that the specific characteristics of the supervisory 
control of bank M&A activity are the main explanatory variables for the different responses 
of banks to the strengthening of merger control. In particular, bank stock prices react more 
positively upon legislative changes in merger control when more discretion is embedded in 
the enforcement of the supervisory control. This result suggests that bank investors see the 
potential for discretion in the supervisory control of bank M&As as value-decreasing and 
anticipate the strengthening of the merger control as a way to create separation of powers 
and thus a checks and balances mechanism to the supervisory control. 
Our results suggest also that any attempt to increase the transparency and the 
accountability of the supervisory control of bank M&As should improve the efficiency and 
the profitability of the banking system. This is in line with the results of a survey conducted 
by the European Commission that the “misuse of supervisory power” is an important 
obstacle to cross-border consolidation. This has led the Commission to revise the Banking 
Directive governing the supervisory control of M&As, in order to make supervisory control 
more uniform and more transparent across Europe (e.g., European_Commission (2007)). 
Our results should not be interpreted as meaning that the supervisory control is 
problematic per se or that it is generally badly implemented. Neither can one infer from our 
results that competition policy is always and everywhere “wholesome” and never swayed 
by institutional or political agendas (Aktas, De Bodt and Roll (2004), Aktas, de Bodt and 
Roll (2007), Duso, Neven and Röller (2007)). Rather, our results suggest that the discretion 
which can be pursued under the objective of “sound and prudent management” of the 
supervisory control may hurt investor expectations and thus valuations of banks. 
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An important area for future research is to assess the stability implications of the more 
competition oriented reviews in the banking sector. This extension would allow for an 
overall welfare evaluation of the observed policy changes. It would also add to the active 
debate about whether there is a trade-off or complementarity between competition and 
stability in banking. 
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Austria January 1, 1993 0.5 1 1 1
Belgium August 5, 1991 1 1 0.66 1
Denmark May 26, 2000 1 0.8 1 1
EU December 21, 1989 1 1 0.8 1
Finland April 30, 1998 1 0.8 1 1
France May 15, 2001 0 0 0 0.5
France August 1, 2003 0 0 0 0.5
Greece March 8, 1991 1 1 0.66 1
Ireland April 10, 2002 0.25 0.6 0.34 0
Italy October 10, 1990 1 1 1 1
Netherlands March 20, 1997 1 1 0.66 1
Norway June 9, 1993 1 1 1 0.5
Norway March 2, 2004 0 0 ‐0.34 0.5
Portugal April 10, 2003 0 0.6 ‐0.34 0
Spain July 17, 1989 0.5 0.4 1 0.5
Spain April 16, 1999 0 0 0 0.5
Sweden December 17, 1992 0.5 0.8 1 1
Sweden April 1, 2000 0.25 0 0 0
Switzerland October 6, 1995 1 1 0.66 1
UK November 5, 2002 0.5 0.4 ‐0.5 0
Changes in Competition Control
CHANGES IN KEY MERGER CONTROL VARIABLES DEFINING THE EVENTS
TABLE 1
NOTE. ‐‐ Criteria is based on the question: What assessment criteria are used in
merger control? 1=only competition criteria; ½=also other criteria; 0=none, no merger
control. Enforcer is based on: Who is (are) the decision‐making agency(ies) for merger
control? 1=antitrust authority or court; 4/5=multiple antitrust agencies; 3/5=antitrust
and other agencies (e.g., minister); 2/5=only other agencies (e.g., minister); 1/5=sector
regulator; 0= none, no merger control. Overturning on: Can a third agency intervene in
the process and replace / overturn the decision‐making agency(ies)? 1=not possible;
2/3=public (ex‐post) overturning of case‐specific decisions; 1/3 =appropriation of
decision‐making power; 0= none, no merger control. Mandatory Notification on: Is 
merger notification mandatory above (statutory) thresholds? 1=yes; 1/2=no; 0=none,
no merger control.
Country Event Date Source Database Hits Importance Changes in the 120-Day Period prior to the Event Date
Austria January 1, 1993 LexisNexis 139 Low
Belgium August 5, 1991 Le Soir 136 Low
Denmark May 26, 2000 LexisNexis 181 Low
EU December 21, 1989 European Commission 355 Low
Finland April 30, 1998 LexisNexis 112 Medium Signing up for EMU
France May 15, 2001 Les Echos 469 Low
France August 1, 2003 LexisNexis 274 Low
Greece March 8, 1991 LexisNexis 110 High Privatisations
Ireland April 10, 2002 The Irish Times 146 Low
Italy October 10, 1990 La Repubblica 965 Low
Netherlands March 20, 1997 LexisNexis 120 Low
Norway June 9, 1993 LexisNexis 106 Low
Norway March 2, 2004 LexisNexis 106 Low
Portugal April 10, 2003 LexisNexis 119 High Privatisations; new FDI agency; corporate tax reform; labour reform
Spain July 17, 1989 LexisNexis 126 Medium Major stockmarket reform; announcement to join EMS
Spain April 16, 1999 LexisNexis 150 High  Privatisations, exchange rates with Euro are fixed
Sweden December 17, 1992 LexisNexis 125 Low
Sweden April 1, 2000 LexisNexis 66 Low
Switzerland October 6, 1995 LexisNexis 143 Low
UK November 5, 2002 Financial Times 213 Low
TABLE 2
IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE COUNTRY IN THE 120‐DAY PERIOD PRIOR TO THE EVENT DAY
NOTE. ‐‐ The table reports the number of hits, our assessment of importance and the relevant content when searching in the reported source databases for the country name and one of
the words "shock", privatisation", or "regulation" (or equivalent word in the foreign language) appearing in articles published in the 120‐day period prior to the event date.
Event Windows [‐120, 0] [‐60, 0] [‐20, 0] [1, 20] [1, 60]
Firm indices Mean ‐2.6 * ‐2.4 ** ‐1.0 ** ‐0.3 ‐1.0
Median ‐0.5 ‐1.8 ‐0.5 ‐0.1 0.0
{(≥0)‐(<0)} {8‐12} {6‐14} * {6‐14} * {9‐11} {10‐10}
Bank indices Mean 7.8 * 4.9 * 2.3 * ‐0.5 1.9
Median 1.7 2.8 1.0 0.1 0.2
{(≥0)‐(<0)} {12‐8} {13‐7} {13‐7} {11‐9} {10‐10}
Bank‐Firm indices Mean 10.4 * 7.5 *** 3.3 ** ‐0.2 2.8
Median 1.8 4.2 ** 1.9 ** 0.2 0.6
{(≥0)‐(<0)}{(≥0)‐(<0)} {12‐8}{8‐12} {13‐7}{6‐14} ** {13‐7}{6‐14} ** {11‐9}{9‐11} {10‐10}{10‐10}
Firm stocks Mean ‐3.8 *** ‐2.1 *** 0.4 * 0.7 *** ‐1.1 ***
Median ‐2.9 *** ‐2.1 *** 0.0 ‐0.1 ‐1.8 ***
{(≥0)‐(<0)} {771‐964} *** {776‐1,008} *** {905‐897} {888‐914} {778‐1,006} ***
Bank stocks Mean 3.7 ** 0.2 ‐0.1 0.6 0.8
Median 2.5 ** ‐0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
{(≥0)‐(<0)} {77‐54} ** {63‐70} {67‐66} {67‐66} {67‐66}
Bank‐Firm stocks Mean 7.5 *** 2.3 ** ‐0.5 ‐0.1 2.4 *
Median 5.4 *** 1.6 0.0 0.2 1.9 *
{(≥0)‐(<0)}{(≥0)‐(<0)} {77‐54}{771‐964} *** {63‐70}{776‐1,008} {67‐66}{905‐897} {67‐66}{888‐914} {67‐66}{778‐1,006}
Large Bank‐Large Firm stocks Mean 5.7 ** 1.9 ‐0.7 0.6 2.7
Median 3.6 * 0.4 ‐0.4 0.8 2.9
{(≥0)‐(<0)}{(≥0)‐(<0)} {379‐485}{37‐30} * {403‐488}{31‐37} {466‐433}{33‐35} {420‐479}{35‐33} {370‐521}{38‐30} **
Small Bank‐Small Firm stocks Mean 9.3 *** 2.6 * ‐0.4 ‐0.9 2.1
Median 6.9 *** 2.5 * 0.5 ‐0.6 1.0
{(≥0)‐(<0)}{(≥0)‐(<0)} {392‐479}{40‐24} *** {373‐520}{32‐33} {439‐464}{34‐31} {468‐435}{32‐33} {408‐485}{29‐36}
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS IN PERCENT FOR ANNOUNCEMENTS OF MERGER CONTROL LEGISLATION FOR BANKS AND FIRMS
TABLE 3
NOTE. ‐‐ Percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for exchange‐listed banks and firms are estimated around the announcement of changes in merger control using both the value‐
weighted country and world index in the market model. The first rows in each cell lists the Mean and Median CARs across events while the last row reports the number of positive minus
the number of negative CARs between parentheses. The reported significance levels are based on standard t‐tests for the Means, binomial probabilities assuming equal probability of
occurrence for the number of positives versus negatives, the Mann Whitney Wilcoxon test for the difference in medians, and the Pearson value of the Chi‐Square test for the number of
bank positives and negatives versus firm positives and negatives. Banks and firms are grouped in large and small size categories according to market capitalization.
Event Windows [‐120, 0] [‐60, 0] [‐20, 0] [1, 20] [1, 60]
Insurance stocks Mean 6.4 ** 2.1 2.3 ** 2.2 ** 1.9
Median 3.5 ** ‐1.1 1.6 ** 1.4 ‐3.9
{(≥0)‐(<0)} {37‐21} ** {29‐32} {39‐23} ** {34‐28} {25‐36}
Telecom stocks Mean 2.4 ‐1.2 ‐1.6 ‐1.4 ‐1.0
Median ‐0.4 ‐3.4 ‐0.4 ‐1.7 ‐2.8
{(≥0)‐(<0)} {9‐9} {8‐10} {7‐11} {7‐11} {8‐10}
Utilities stocks Mean ‐2.9 ‐3.5 * ‐0.7 ‐0.2 0.5
Median ‐3.1 ‐4.5 *** ‐1.5 ** ‐1.0 * 0.6
{(≥0)‐(<0)} {23‐28} {16‐38} *** {21‐36} ** {22‐35} * {28‐26}
Healthcare stocks Mean ‐0.6 ‐4.6 ‐1.5 ‐0.4 ‐10.0 ***
Median ‐0.9 ‐1.4 * ‐1.1 ‐1.2 ** ‐4.0 ***
{(≥0)‐(<0)} {36‐39} {35‐44} * {38‐41} {30‐49} ** {27‐52} ***
TABLE 4
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS IN PERCENT FOR ANNOUNCEMENTS OF MERGER CONTROL LEGISLATION ACROSS INDUSTRIES
NOTE. ‐‐ Percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for exchange‐listed firms in the indicated industry are estimated around the announcement of changes in merger control using
the value‐weighted country and world index in the market model. The first rows in each cell lists the Mean and Median CAR across events while the last row reports the number of
positive minus the number of negative CARs between parentheses. The reported significance levels are based on standard t‐tests for the Means and binomial probabilities assuming
equal probability of occurence for the number of positives versus negatives.
N Mean StDev Min Max N Mean StDev Min Max
Supervisory Criteria What assessment criteria are used in supervisory merger/acquisition control? 133 0.36 0.24 0 1 1,802 0.42 0.26 0 1
1=not only supervisory criteria (i.e., stability, soundness, prudency) but also other criteria; 
½=only supervisory criteria; 0=none, no supervisory merger/acquisition  control in banking
Supervisory Enforcer Who is (are) the decision-making agency(ies) for supervisory merger/acquisition control? 133 0.31 0.27 0 1 1,802 0.32 0.26 0 1
1=minister; 4/5=central bank and minister; 3/5= independent supervisor and minister; 
2/5=central bank; 1/5= independent supervisor; 0=none, no supervisory merger/acquisition 
control in banking
Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public Are supervisory decisions following formal notification public? 133 0.67 0.45 0 1 1,802 0.68 0.39 0 1
1=no; 1/2=yes; 0=no supervisory control
Supervisory Informal Notification Is there any informal communication and/or notification between the supervisory agency(ies) 
and the parties before formal notification?
133 0.45 0.32 0 1 1,802 0.57 0.36 0 1
1=yes, formally in the law and mandatory; 2/3=yes, but only as common practise; 1/3=no 
notification; 0=no supervisory control
Mean of Supervisory Strength Indices = (Supervisory Criteria + Supervisory Enforcer + Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public + 
Supervisory Informal Notification)/4
133 0.45 0.29 0 0.80 1,802 0.50 0.27 0 0.87
1=unfocused, politically-motivated and informationally opaque supervisory control possible; 
...; 0=no supervisory control
Efficiency Defense Are efficiency gains explicitly considered as a factor mitigating anticompetitive effects? 133 0.36 0.48 0 1 1,802 0.29 0.45 0 1
1=yes; 0=no
Bureaucracy Quality Assessment of the quality of the bureaucracy 133 3.62 0.57 2.17 4 1,802 3.78 0.42 2.17 4
Accounts for the strength and expertise of the bureaucracy to govern without drastic changes in 
policy or interruptions in government services. In that case the bureaucracy tends to be 
somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for 
recruitment and training. Source: International Country Risk Guide
4=high quality; …; 1=low quality
Corruption Assessment of corruption within the political system 133 4.76 0.99 2.25 6 1,802 4.61 1.05 2.25 6
Accounts for financial corruption (e.g., demands for special payments and bribes connected 
with import and export licenses) and actual/potential corruption in the form of excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously 
close ties between politics and business. Source: International Country Risk Guide
6=not corrupt; …; 1=very corrupt
Sector HHI The sum of squared sector shares of exchange-listed banks (firms) by market capitalization 
(sectors are based on the three-digit Industry Classification Benchmark codes provided by 
Datastream ).
133 0.3082 0.1779 0.103 1 1,789 0.40 0.29 0.04 1
1=concentrated; ...; 0=unconcentrated
Bank (Firm) Size Market capitalization of the bank (firm). Source: Datastream 133 17,599 34,865 178 268,892 1,802 7,998 26,504 1 406,552
in billion Euros
HHI * Bank (Firm) Size = HHI * Bank (Firm) Capitalization 133 6,374 14,688 22 89,518 1,789 4,082 19,482 0 395,567
Banks Firms
TABLE 5
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE NAMES, DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
  NOTE. -- The table lists the the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (StDev), mimimum (Min) and maximum (Max).
Banks ID N (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
CAR[-20,0] (1) 133 1
CAR[-60,0] (2) 133 0.60 *** 1
CAR[-120,0] (3) 131 -0.31 *** 0.29 *** 1
Supervisory Criteria (4) 133 0.30 *** 0.28 *** -0.17 * 1
Supervisory Enforcer (5) 133 0.23 *** 0.28 *** -0.14 0.80 *** 1
Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public (6) 133 0.32 *** 0.31 *** -0.18 ** 0.88 *** 0.68 *** 1
Supervisory Informal Notification (7) 133 0.33 *** 0.29 *** -0.21 ** 0.87 *** 0.71 *** 0.84 *** 1
Mean of Supervisory Indices (8) 133 0.32 *** 0.32 *** -0.19 ** 0.96 *** 0.84 *** 0.94 *** 0.93 *** 1
Efficiency Defense (9) 133 0.14 * 0.06 -0.22 ** 0.41 *** 0.10 0.55 *** 0.43 *** 0.43 *** 1
Bureaucracy Quality (10) 133 -0.23 *** -0.21 ** 0.12 -0.38 *** -0.41 *** -0.49 *** -0.50 *** -0.49 *** -0.29 *** 1
Corruption (11) 133 0.03 -0.13 -0.16 * -0.20 ** -0.26 *** -0.24 ** -0.17 ** -0.24 *** 0.15 * 0.36 *** 1
Bank Sector HHI (12) 133 0.17 * 0.17 * -0.18 ** 0.74 *** 0.69 *** 0.63 *** 0.60 *** 0.71 *** 0.32 *** -0.02 0.04 1
Bank Size (13) 133 0.14 -0.02 -0.22 ** 0.12 0.12 -0.05 0.19 ** 0.09 -0.20 ** 0.14 0.19 ** 0.15 * 1
Bank Sector HHI * Bank Size (14) 133 0.17 ** 0.02 -0.19 ** 0.25 *** 0.26 *** 0.03 0.26 *** 0.19 ** -0.15 * 0.12 0.19 ** 0.33 *** 0.91 *** 1
Firms ID N (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (13) (12) (14)
CAR[-20,0] (1) 1,802 1
CAR[-60,0] (2) 1,784 0.43 *** 1
CAR[-120,0] (3) 1,735 0.17 *** 0.64 *** 1
Supervisory Criteria (4) 1,802 0.03 0.13 *** 0.01 1
Supervisory Enforcer (5) 1,802 0.01 0.17 *** 0.15 *** 0.81 *** 1
Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public (6) 1,802 0.07 *** 0.13 *** 0.05 * 0.76 *** 0.58 *** 1
Supervisory Informal Notification (7) 1,802 0.09 *** 0.05 ** -0.23 *** 0.67 *** 0.36 *** 0.64 *** 1
Mean of Supervisory Indices (8) 1,802 0.07 *** 0.14 *** -0.02 0.93 *** 0.76 *** 0.89 *** 0.81 *** 1
Efficiency Defense (9) 1,802 0.02 0.22 *** 0.27 *** 0.36 *** 0.32 *** 0.44 *** 0.17 *** 0.38 *** 1
Bureaucracy Quality (10) 1,802 -0.02 -0.12 *** -0.14 *** -0.16 *** -0.32 *** -0.41 *** -0.24 *** -0.34 *** -0.43 *** 1
Corruption (11) 1,802 -0.06 ** -0.07 *** -0.11 *** -0.07 *** -0.11 *** -0.38 *** -0.03 -0.19 *** -0.03 0.46 *** 1
Firm Sector HHI (12) 1,789 -0.05 ** 0.07 *** 0.19 *** 0.24 *** 0.42 *** 0.24 *** -0.07 *** 0.22 *** 0.30 *** -0.22 *** -0.06 *** 1
Firm Size (13) 1,802 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 *** -0.06 ** 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.08 *** 0.19 *** 0.11 *** 1
Firm Sector HHI * Firm Size (14) 1,789 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 ** 0.11 *** -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 * 0.12 *** 0.22 *** 0.89 *** 1
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
TABLE 6
  NOTE. -- The table displays the Pearson's correlation coefficients between all dependent and independent variables for the bank and firm samples, respectively, in the upper and lower panel. The significance levels are determined by 
calculating for each correlation coefficient r  and number of observations N : t=r/sqrt[(1-r 2 )/(N-2)] , which is approximately distributed as Student-t with N-2  degrees of freedom. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent level, respectively.
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Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Sample
Dependent Variable: CAR [-20,0] [-20,0] [-20,0] [-20,0] [-20,0] [-60,0] [-120,0] [-20,0] [-60,0] [-120,0]
Supervisory Criteria 14.04 **
(6.07)
Supervisory Enforcer 5.21
(3.71)
Supervisory Formal Decisions Not Public 10.07 ***
(2.78)
Supervisory Informal Notification 9.22 **
(3.30)
Mean of Supervisory Indices 15.14 *** 17.34 *** 2.69 3.10 *** 3.45 -21.03 **
(4.99) (5.13) (6.43) (0.90) (2.38) (9.28)
Efficiency Defense 0.26 2.18 -1.45 0.26 0.04 -2.79 -6.30 * 0.59 7.67 *** 19.77 ***
(1.76) (1.98) (2.19) (1.87) (1.77) (2.39) (3.18) (0.74) (1.64) (4.64)
Bureaucracy Quality -3.20 -3.74 -2.27 -2.63 -1.79 -0.55 5.34 1.02 0.27 1.45
(2.14) (2.27) (2.45) (2.62) (2.66) (2.65) (3.15) (0.86) (1.34) (5.80)
Corruption 1.28 0.84 1.53 * 1.00 1.41 0.17 -2.49 -0.83 ** -1.09 * -4.12
(0.88) (1.11) (0.79) (1.28) (0.94) (1.23) (1.63) (0.31) (0.54) (2.64)
Bank (Firm) Sector HHI -5.28 1.71 -7.32 -1.28 -9.32 -7.62 -17.43 * -2.07 -0.02 14.06 *
(7.88) (8.30) (5.52) (7.34) (7.70) (5.11) (9.20) (1.53) (1.75) (7.52)
Bank (Firm) Size 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.25 ** 0.05 0.06 0.12
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12)
Bank (Firm) Sector HHI * Bank (Firm) Size 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.34 0.01 0.07 * -0.14
(0.19) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.26) (0.24) (0.00) (0.04) (0.12)
Constant 1.18 5.66 -3.94 0.28 -4.88 -2.63 4.97 -0.64 -2.23 8.44
(6.46) (7.12) (7.87) (8.58) (8.45) (8.21) (9.33) (2.98) (5.80) (16.35)
Number of Observations 133 133 133 133 133 133 131 1,789 1,771 1,722
Adjusted R-squared 0.1508 0.1266 0.1701 0.1457 0.1611 0.1230 0.1528 0.0174 0.0531 0.1278
TABLE 7
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS
NOTE. -- The dependent variable in the linear models is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in percent for exchange-listed banks and firms within an event window that starts 20, 60 or 120 days prior to the event day
and runs until (and includes) the event day. Standard errors are clustered at the event level. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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FIGURE 1 
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 FIGURE 2 
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS OF ITALIAN BANK STOCKS DURING THE TAKEOVER BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF ANTONVENETA 
RECENT EVENTS IN ITALY AND CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS ON ITALIAN BANK STOC
  
 
 
 
 
NOTE. -- The figure reports the cumulative abnormal returns of Italian bank stocks while the panel below reports the percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all 
exchange-listed banks in Italy (All Banks), Banca Popolare Italiana (BPI), and the Antonveneta Bank (Banca Antoniana Populare Veneta, BAPV). Excess returns are 
estimated using the value-weighted Italian country index in the market model around the announcement of the indicated events. The first cell lists the CAR, the second the 
significance levels. The reported significance levels are based on standard t-tests. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
  
Event Date CAR(0, 2) CAR(0, 20) CAR(0, 60)
1 McCreevy warns Fazio not to block foreign takeovers 8-Feb-05 1.21 0.54 0.79 3.23 -1.53 10.47 * 10.62 ** -5.38 25.54 ***
2 Banca d' Italia aproves proposal of BPI to acquire control of BAPV July 11, 2005 0.92 4.23 -0.77 -0.04 2.58 -8.18 -5.40 47.93 ** -27.57 *
3 Banca d' Italia suspends proposal given to BPI July 30, 2005 0.03 -3.11 -0.45 0.59 -7.51 3.87 5.87 -58.15 *** 28.29 *
4 Berlusconi calls on Fazio to resign September 23, 2005 0.05 -1.27 -0.94 4.89 * -25.73 *** 4.04 6.59 -3.23 -8.12
5 Fazio resigns / House approves law with transfer December 19-22, 2005 1.67 * 11.02 *** -0.92 0.31 17.17 ** -1.65 5.03 28.64 ** -7.37
BPI BAPVAll BanksAll Banks BPI BAPVBPI BAPVAll Banks
APPENDIX 1 
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOURCES DEALING WITH MERGER AND SUPERVISORY CONTROL 
   
Country Source Www 
   
All Getting the Deal Through, Merger Control http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com/main_fs.cfm?book=MergerControl 
 International Competition Network, Merger Review Laws, Related 
Materials, and Templates. 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mergercontrollaws.html 
 OECD, Competition. http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,2646,en_2649_37463_1_1_1_1_37463,00.html 
 OECD, Competition Law and Policy. http://www.oecd.org/infobycountry/0,2646,en_2649_34685_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
 OECD, 1996, Failing Firm Defence, CLP Report, (96)23, Paris.  
 OECD, 1998, Enhancing the Role of Competition in Bank Regulation, 
DAFFE/CLP Report, (98)16, Paris. 
 
 OECD, 1999, Relationship between Regulators and Competition 
Authorities, DAFFE/CLP Report, (99)8, Paris. 
 
 OECD, 2000, Mergers in Financial Services, DAFFE/CLP Report, 
(2000)17, Paris. 
 
 OECD, 2002, The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform, 
DAFEE/CLP Report, (2002), Paris.  
 
 World Bank and International Monetary Fund, Global Banking Law 
Database. 
http://www.gbld.org/ 
Austria Global Competition Review, Austria http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
Denmark Global Competition Review, Denmark. http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
EU Ghezzi F. and P. Magnani, 1998, L´applicazione della disciplina antitrust 
comunitaria al settore bancario, in M. Polo (ed.), Industria Bancaria e 
Concorrenza, Il Mulino, 143-259. 
 
Finland Finnish Competition Authority, Annual Reports, 2001, 2002, 2003.  
 Global Competition Review, Finland. http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
France Fried Frank, Client Memoranda, 2002, The New Features of French 
Antitrust Law by Eric Cafritz and Omer Tene. 
http://www.ffhsj.com/cmemos/021102_newfeat.htm 
 Global Competition Review, France: Merger Control. http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
 Jurismag, 2001, Le magazine rédigé par des professionnels du droit, The 
New French Rules for Merger Control, by A. Condomines, Avocat à la 
Cour. 
http://www.jurismag.net/articles/artiGB-concent.htm 
 Practical Law Company, Global Council Web, Merger Control – France. http://global.practicallaw.com/jsp/article.jsp?item=:1138832 
 Olcay Miller, P., 20004, Authorisation of Bank Mergers—Recent French 
Experience, mimeo, Queen Mary and Westfield College. 
 
Germany Global Competition Review, Germany. http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
Ireland Global Competition Review, Ireland. http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
Italy Bianco, M., F. Ghezzi, W. Negrini and P. Signorini (1998b), 
‗Applicazioni della disciplina antitrust al settore bancario in Italia‘, in M. 
Polo (ed), Industria Bancaria e Concorrenza, Bologna: Il Mulino, 329-
374. 
 
Norway Global Competition Review, Norwegian competition law: overview and 
recent developments. 
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
 International Law Office (ILO), Competition - Norway 1998, 1999, 
2001, 2004. 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/lettersresults.cfm?Newsletters__WorkAreas=Co
mpetition 
Portugal Global Competition Review, Portugal. http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
Spain Banco de Espana, 2001, ―Basic Regulatory Structure of the Spanish 
Banking System‖, Annex I to Annual Report. 
 
Sweden Global Competition Review, Sweden. http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eur_atr.cfm 
 International Law Office (ILO), ―Competition – Sweden‖. http://www.internationallawoffice.com/lettersresults.cfm?Newsletters__WorkAreas=Co
mpetition 
US Bianco, M., F. Ghezzi and P. Magnani, 1998a, ―L‘applicazione della 
disciplina antitrust nel settore bancario statunitense‖, in M. Polo (ed), 
Industria Bancaria e Concorrenza, Bologna: Il Mulino, 143-258. 
 
 
NOTE. -- The table reports the sources we have used to collect the legal and institutional country characteristics on merger and supervisory control. We report only 
documents and sources other than the laws. 
APPENDIX 2 
CONTACTED AGENCIES DEALING WITH MERGER AND SUPERVISORY CONTROL 
   
Country Agency  
   
Austria Cartel Court  
 Federal Competition Authority (of Austria)  
 Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA)  
 European Central Bank  
Belgium Federal Public Service Economy   
 European Central Bank  
Canada Competition Bureau  
Denmark Danish Competition Authority  
 Danish Financial Supervisory Authority  
Finland Finnish Competition Authority  
 European Central Bank  
France Queen Mary and Westfield College  
 European Central Bank  
Germany German Competition Authority  
 Deutsche Bundesbank  
 European Central Bank  
Greece Hellenic Competition Authority  
 Bank of Greece  
 European Central Bank  
Ireland Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment  
 Irish Competition Authority  
Italy Italian Competition Authority  
 Bank of Italy  
Netherlands Netherlands Competition Authority  
 Nederlandsche Bank  
Norway Norwegian Competition Authority  
 Ministry of Finance  
 Norges Bank  
Portugal Portuguese Competition Authority  
 European Central Bank  
Spain Banco de Espana  
 European Central Bank  
Sweden Swedish Competition Authority  
 Finansinspektionen  
UK Office of Fair Trading  
 Financial Service Authority  
 European Central Bank  
US Federal Reserve Board  
   
 
  NOTE. -- The table reports the agencies we would like to thank for helping us with the collection of the legal and 
institutional country characteristics on merger and supervisory control. It is not our intention to implicate these 
agencies or their affiliated institutions and we consider all the remaining errors in the reporting as ours. For each 
country we order the contacts we had as follows: (1) the competition authorities, (2) the national supervisors and/or 
central banks, and if applicable (3) the European Central Bank. 
APPENDIX 3. LEGAL AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ITALY AND EUROPE IN 2005 
BAPV: Antoveneta Bank (Banca Antoniana Populare Veneta), Berlusconi: prime minister of Italy; BI: Banca d‘ Italia, BPI: Banca Popolare Italiana; CONSOB: the stock 
market regulator; EC: European Commission; Fazio: former governor of the Banca d‘ Italia; Govt: Government; McCreevy is the European Internal Market Commissioner; 
Kroes is the European Competition Commissioner. 
 
Law Transfer Competition Control 
 
14.01: Govt proposes law WITHOUT transfer, but 
 Parliamentary Committee will add it 
03.03: Lower House votes NOT to transfer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
03.09: Govt proposes law WITHOUT transfer, but 
Press expects Senate to add it 
11.10: Senate approves law WITHOUT transfer 
 
ABN AMRO versus BPI for BAPV 
 
12.01: ABN Amro seeks new shareholder pact to 
control BAPV 
21.01: BPI seeks to split BAPV to acquire control 
 
 
11.07: BI approves proposal BPI to acquire BAPV 
 
25.07: Court confiscates shares of BPI & allies 
CONSOB suspends BPI‘s bid 
30.07: BI suspends BPI approval 
01.08: House arrest for BPI top management 
 
23.09: Berlusconi calls on Fazio to resign 
15.10: BI cancels BPI approval 
19.10: ABN Amro wins bid 
 
19.12: Fazio resigns 
European Commission 
 
08.02: McCreevy warns Fazio against blocking 
foreign bank takeovers 
12.02: Fazio says cross-border banking mergers 
can be ―difficult‖ 
 
14.05: McCreevy sends letter with concerns 
24.05: Kroes says she may sue Italy 
22.12: Lower House approves law WITH transfer 
23.12: Senate approves law WITH transfer 
28.12: President approves law (published 12.01.06) 
  
 
